Operational Situation Report USSR No. 128
The Chief of the Security Police and the SD Berlin,
November 2, 1941
As to purely execution matters, approximately 80,000 person have been
liquidated by now by the Kommandos of the Einsatzgruppe.
Among these are approximately 8,000 person convicted after investigation of
anti-German or Bolshevist activities. The remainder was liquidated in
Several retaliatory measures were carried out as large-scale actions. The
largest of these actions took place immediately after the occupation of
Kiev. It was carried out exclusively against Jews and their entire families.
The difficulties resulting from such a large-scale action, in particular
concerning the round-up, were overcome in Kiev by requesting the Jewish
population to assemble, using wall posters. Although at first only the
participation of 5-6000 Jews had been expected, more than 30,000 Jews
arrived who, until the moment of their execution, still believed in their
resettlement, thanks to extremely clever organization.
Even though approximately 75,000 Jews have been liquidated in this manner,
it is evident at this time that this cannot be the best solution of the
Jewish problem. Although we succeeded, particularly in smaller towns and
villages, in bringing about a complete liquidation of the Jewish problem,
nevertheless, again and again it has been observed in the larger cities that
after such an action, all Jews have indeed been eradicated.
But, when after a certain period of time a
Kommando returns, the number of Jews still found in the city always
surpasses considerably the number of executed Jews. Besides, the Kommandos
have also carried out military actions in numerous cases. On request of the
Army, separate platoons of the Kommandos have repeatedly combed the woods
searching for partisans, and have accomplished successful work there.
Besides, prisoners-of-war marching along the highways were systematically
overtaken by the Kommandos of the EG. All those elements were liquidated who
did not possess identification papers and who were suspected, once set free,
of committing acts of sabotage against the German Army, the German
authorities, or the population. In numerous cases, systematic searches for
parachutists were carried out, with the result that approximately 20
parachutists were captured, among them a Russian who, at his interrogation
supplied extremely important information to the Army.
Finally, it should be mentioned that prisoners-of-war were taken over from
the prisoner assembly points and the prisoner-of-war transit camps, although
at times, considerable disagreements with the camp commander occurred.
Collaboration with the Wehrmacht and the Secret Field Police
This concerns the relation of the Einsatzgruppe and its Kommandos with other
offices and authorities. Its relation to the Army is especially noteworthy.
From the outset, the Einsatzgruppe succeeded in establishing excellent terms
with all Army headquarters. This made it possible for the Einsatzgruppe
never to operate in the rear of the military zone. On the contrary, the
request was frequently made by the Army to operate as far on the front as
In a great number of cases, it happened that the
support of the Einsatzkommandos was requested by the fighting troops.
Advance detachments of the Einsatzgruppe also participated in every large
military action. They entered newly captured localities side by side with
the fighting troops. Thus, in all cases, the utmost support was given. For
example, in this connection, it is worth mentioning the participation in the
capture of Zhitomir, where the first tanks entering the city were
immediately followed by three cars of Einsatzkommando 4a.
As a result of the successful work of the Einsatzgruppe, the Security Police
is also held in high regard, in particular by the HQ of the German Army. The
liaison officers stationed in Army HQ are loyally briefed of all military
operations, and, besides, they receive the utmost cooperation. The Commander
of the 6th Army, Generalfeldmarschall von Richenau, has repeatedly praised
the work of the Einsatzkommandos and, accordingly, supported the interests
of the SD with his staff.
The extraordinary success of the Kommandos was a
contributing factor: for example, the capture of Major-General Sokolov, then
information concerning a plan by parachutists to blast a bridge, and the
transmission of other important military information.
Only with respect to the Jewish problem could a complete understanding with
junior Army officers not be reached until quite recently. This was most
noticeable during the taking over of prisoner-of-war camps. As a
particularly clear example, the conduct of a camp commander in Vinitsa is to
be mentioned. He strongly objected to the transfer of 362 Jewish
prisoners-of-war carried out by his deputy, and even started court martial
proceedings against the deputy and two other officers.
Unfortunately, it often occurred that the
Einsatzkommandos had to suffer more or less hidden reproaches for their
persistent stand on the Jewish problem. Another difficulty was added by the
order from the Army High Command prohibiting entry by the SD into the POW
transit camps. (1) These difficulties have probably been overcome by now due
to a new order from the Army High Command.
This order clearly states that the Wehrmacht has
to cooperate in the solution of this problem, and, in particular, that the
necessary authorizations must be granted the SD to the fullest extent.
However, it became evident in the past few days that this policy-making
order still has not reached lower [military] authorities. In the future,
further cooperation and assistance by the Wehrmacht authorities can be
As far as the province of the 6th Army HQ is
concerned, Generalfeldmarschall von Reichenau issued an order on October 10,
1941, which states clearly that the Russian soldier has to be considered in
principal to be a representative of Bolshevism and thus to be treated
accordingly by the Wehrmacht.
No difficulties whatsoever resulted from the cooperation with the Secret
Military Police. To be sure, it was noted that the Security Military Police
preferred to handle matters concerning the Security Police only, evidently
because of a lack of other duties; however, these defects were always
eliminated following consultation. Besides, the latest order of the Chief of
the Military Police has probably eliminated any remaining doubts.
The exchange of informational material between
the SD and the GFP took place without any disagreement. The original doubts
whether the GFP would not retain some of the cases were not justified.
Besides, it has already been ordered by Army HQ and its staff that matters
concerning the Security Police have to be immediately transferred to the
As for the counter-intelligence offices in the rear, the work there is
running smoothly. Counter-intelligence officers regularly visit
Kommandos in order to transfer files, as well as to receive orders.
Since the work of the Security Police has been carried out smoothly and has
won high recognition, it can be assumed that this present relationship will
also be maintained in the future.
Translations by Hermann Feuer
Copyright: H.E.A.R.T 2008